Chris Hoofnagle
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Chris Hoofnagle
Chris Jay Hoofnagle is an American professor at the University of California, Berkeley who teaches information privacy law, computer crime law, regulation of online privacy, and internet law. Hoofnagle has made notable contributions to the privacy literature through a set of surveys that establish that most Americans prefer not to be targeted online for advertising and that, despite claims to the contrary, young people care about privacy and take actions to protect it. Hoofnagle is the author of Federal Trade...
activities both business candidates clearly detailed gotten illegal information likely limit order parties personal political practices themselves using
In the political field, candidates and parties have gotten away with a lot of practices that would clearly be illegal if a business did them. Both parties are using detailed databases of personal information that are completely unregulated. And they're not likely to be regulated, because the politicians themselves would have to limit their activities in order to do so.
argument created deciding federal government perplexed states sure
I am kind of perplexed by their argument, ... You have a federally mandated program, created with federal dollars, but the states are issuing it. The states are not deciding anything, so I am not really sure how it is not a federal ID when the federal government makes all the decisions.
existing inadequate personal practices stop trade
Existing carrier practices and regulations are inadequate to stop this trade in personal information.
breach fear instantly lose security send start wants
No one wants to send out a security breach notice. You instantly become a pariah, and the fear is that you'll start to lose customers.
analyze content invites law level national secondary technology whether
A technology that can analyze content at that level invites secondary uses, whether it's law enforcement or national security.
computer crack easier fool giving information
It's just a lot easier to fool someone into giving you this information than to actually crack into a computer system.
difficulty easy lawsuits related telephone
The lawsuits are great. But a related difficulty here is that it's too easy to get telephone records.
addressing claim fraudulent issues linked missed privacy product social spam
What often is missed with social irritants like spam and telemarketing is that they are a product of privacy violations, ... You can try to marginalize spam, but it is inextricably linked to fraudulent practices. Addressing spam will get at the other issues that they claim to be important.
codes debates efforts identify later law outside people political privacy risk
The privacy risk is that these codes may be later used for other law enforcement efforts outside counterfeiting, or to identify people who try to participate in political debates anonymously.
arguing creating id national
We're arguing that it is creating a national ID system.
breach congress data huge industry mess notice pressure quite state
There is huge pressure from industry to get Congress to preempt state data breach notice laws. It's quite a mess now.
government laws looking stop
There are no laws that stop the government from looking at that info.
cases court order phone privacy problem sue
The problem with privacy cases is that most privacy plaintiffs have to give up their privacy. In order to sue you have to show up in court and show that they used your phone records.
access against allow checks fast law legal missing obtaining phone procedures provide records
There are established legal procedures for obtaining phone records that provide checks against improper access. These legal procedures allow fast access to phone record for law enforcement and provide accountability. That's what missing here, the accountability.